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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce two new achievable schemes for the fading multiple
access wiretap channel (MAC-WT). In the model that we consider, we assume that
perfect knowledge of the state of all channels is available at all the nodes in a causal
fashion. Our schemes use this knowledge together with the time varying nature of
the channel model to align the interference from different users at the eavesdropper
perfectly in a one-dimensional space while creating a higher dimensionality space for
the interfering signals at the legitimate receiver hence allowing for better chance of
recovery. While we achieve this alignment through signal scaling at the transmitters in
our first scheme (scaling based alignment (SBA)), we let nature provide this alignment
through the ergodicity of the channel coefficients in the second scheme (ergodic secret
alignment (ESA)). For each scheme, we obtain the resulting achievable secrecy rate
region. We show that the secrecy rates achieved by both schemes scale with SNR
as 12 log(SNR). Hence, we show the sub-optimality of the i.i.d. Gaussian signaling
based schemes with and without cooperative jamming by showing that the secrecy
rates achieved using i.i.d. Gaussian signaling with cooperative jamming do not scale
with SNR. In addition, we introduce an improved version of our ESA scheme where we
incorporate cooperative jamming to achieve higher secrecy rates. Moreover, we derive
the necessary optimality conditions for the power control policy that maximizes the
secrecy sum rate achievable by our ESA scheme when used solely and with cooperative
jamming.
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CCF 04-47613, CCF 05-14846, CNS 07-16311 and CCF 07-
29127 and CCF 09-64645, and presented in part at the 47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communications,
Control, and Computing, Monticello, IL, September 2009 [1], and the IEEE International Conference on
Communications, Cape Town, South Africa, May 2010 [2].
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1 Introduction
The notion of information theoretic secrecy was first introduced by Shannon in his seminal
work [3]. Applying the notion of information theoretic secrecy to channel models with single
transmitter, single receiver, and single eavesdropper (wiretapper) was pioneered by Wyner
[4], Csiszar and Korner [5], and Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [6]. Wyner [4], introduced
the wiretap channel where it is assumed that the received signal by the eavesdropper is a
degraded version of the signal received by the legitimate receiver. For his model, Wyner
established the secrecy capacity region, which is defined as the region of all simultaneously
achievable rates and equivocation-rates. In [5], the secrecy capacity region was established
for the general case where the eavesdropper’s channel is not necessarily a degraded version of
the main receiver’s channel. In particular, it was shown that to achieve the secrecy capacity
region of the single user wiretap channel, channel prefixing may be necessary. In channel
prefixing, an auxiliary random variable serves as the input of an artificially created prefix
channel, whose output is used as the input to the original wiretap channel. In [6], the authors
showed that, through plain Gaussian signaling alone, i.e., without channel prefixing, one can
achieve the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel.
The multiple access wiretap channel (MAC-WT) was introduced in [7]. In MAC-WT,
multiple users wish to have secure communication with a single receiver, in the presence of
a passive eavesdropper. References [7] and [8] focus on the Gaussian MAC-WT, and pro-
vide achievable schemes based on Gaussian signaling. Reference [8] goes further than plain
Gaussian signaling and introduces a technique (on top of Gaussian signaling) that uses the
power of a non-transmitting node in jamming the eavesdropper. This technique is called
cooperative jamming. Cooperative jamming is indeed a channel prefixing technique where
specific choices are made for the auxiliary random variables [9]. In addition, cooperative jam-
ming is the first significant application of channel prefixing in a multi-user Gaussian wiretap
channel that improves over plain Gaussian signaling. More recently, reference [10] showed
that for a certain class of Gaussian MAC-WT, one can achieve through Gaussian signaling a
secrecy rate region that is within 0.5 bits of the secrecy capacity region. Consequently, there
has been some expectation that secrecy capacity may be obtained for Gaussian MAC-WT
through i.i.d. Gaussian signaling, potentially with Gaussian channel prefixing.
However, a notable shortcoming of these Gaussian signaling based achievable schemes is
that rates obtained using them do not scale with the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). In other
words, the total number of degrees of freedom (DoF) for the MAC-WT achieved using these
schemes is zero. This observation led to the belief that these schemes, and hence Gaussian
signaling (with or without channel prefixing), may be sub-optimal. This belief is made certain
as a direct consequence of the results on the secure DoF of Gaussian interference networks
that were obtained in several papers, e.g., in [11], [12], [13], [14], and [15]. In particular, in
each of [11] and [12], it was shown that positive secure DoF is achievable for a class of vector
Gaussian interference channels (i.e., time-varying channels where channel state information
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is known non-causally) which in turn implies that positive secure DoF is achievable for the
vector Gaussian MAC-WT. In [13] and [14], it was shown that through structured coding
(e.g., lattice coding), it is possible to achieve positive DoF for a class of scalar (i.e., non-time-
varying) Gaussian channels with interference that contains the Gaussian MAC-WT. More
recently, in [15], an achievable secrecy rate region for the K-user Gaussian MAC-WT was
obtained by incorporating a new alignment technique known as real interference alignment.
This technique performs on a single real line and exploits the properties of real numbers to
align interference in time-invariant channels.
Fading Gaussian MAC-WT was first considered in [16] where the Gaussian signaling and
cooperative jamming schemes which were originally proposed in [7] and [8] are extended to
the fading MAC-WT. Using these schemes, [16] gave achievable ergodic sum secrecy rates
for the fading MAC-WT. Similar to the non-fading setting, these achievable ergodic secrecy
rates do not scale with the average SNRs. In this paper, we propose two new achievable
schemes for the fading Gaussian MAC-WT. Our first achievable scheme, the scaling based
alignment (SBA) scheme, is based on code repetition with proper scaling of transmitted
signals. In particular, transmitters repeat their symbols in two consecutive symbol instants.
Transmitters further scale their transmit signals with the goal of creating a full-rank channel
matrix at the main receiver and a unit-rank channel matrix at the eavesdropper, in every
two consecutive time instants. These coordinated actions create a two-dimensional space for
the signal received by the legitimate receiver, while sustaining the interference in a single-
dimensional space at the eavesdropper. In other words, code repetition with proper scaling
of the transmit signals at each transmitter aligns the received signals at the eavesdropper
perfectly making it difficult for the eavesdropper to decode both messages. Consequently,
we obtain a new achievable secrecy rate region for the two-user fading MAC-WT.
In another recent work [17], it was shown that in a fading interference channel, by code
repetition over properly chosen time instants, one can perfectly cancel interference at each
receiver so that the resulting individual rates scale as 1
2
log(SNR). Thus, the rate reduction
by a factor of 1
2
comes with the benefit of perfect interference cancellation. In this paper,
we extend the ergodic interference alignment concept to a secrecy context and we propose
another achievable scheme which we call ergodic secret alignment (ESA). In the SBA scheme,
code repetition is done over two consecutive time instants, while in the ESA scheme, we
carefully choose the time instants over which we do code repetition such that the received
signals are aligned favorably at the legitimate receiver while they are aligned unfavorably
at the eavesdropper. In particular, given some time instant with the vector of the main
receiver channel coefficients and the vector of the eavesdropper channel coefficients given by
h = [h1 h2]
T and g = [g1 g2]
T , respectively, if X1 and X2 are the symbols transmitted in this
time instant by users 1 and 2, respectively, our objective, roughly speaking, is to determine
the channel gains we should wait for to transmit X1 and X2 again. In this paper, we show
that, in order to maximize achievable secrecy rates, we should wait for a time instant in
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which the main receiver channel coefficients are [h1 − h2]T and the eavesdropper channel
coefficients are [g1 g2]
T . Consequently, we obtain another achievable secrecy rate region for
the two-user fading MAC-WT.
For both proposed schemes, we show that the resulting secrecy rates scale with SNR.
Specifically, the achievable secrecy sum rate scales as 1/2 log(SNR). Moreover, we show
that the secrecy rates achieved through i.i.d. Gaussian signaling with cooperative jamming
in fading MAC-WT do not scale with SNR. The significance of these results is that, they
show that indeed neither plain i.i.d. Gaussian signaling nor i.i.d. Gaussian signaling with
cooperative jamming is optimal for the fading MAC-WT, and that, for high SNRs, one
can achieve higher secrecy rates by aligning interference perfectly in the eavesdropper MAC
while reducing, or cancelling, interference at the main receiver MAC using some coordinated
actions at both transmitters that involve code repetition, i.e., a form of time-correlated (non
i.i.d.) signaling.
In fact, the achievable rate region using the second scheme, the ESA scheme, involves
two significant improvements over the one achieved by the SBA scheme when the channel
coefficients are circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables. First, the expres-
sions for achievable rates by the SBA scheme involve products of the squared magnitudes of
the channel coefficients. The squared magnitudes of the channel coefficients are exponential
random variables and hence multiplying them will intuitively make the small values of their
product occur with higher probability and the large values occur with lower probability.
This in effect reduces the achievable rates by the SBA scheme. On the other hand, the
achievable secrecy rates by the ESA scheme do not have this drawback. In other words,
by code repetition, the SBA scheme creates two (not perfectly) correlated MAC channels
to the main receiver and two perfectly correlated MAC channels to the eavesdropper, while
the ESA scheme creates an orthogonal MAC channel to the main receiver and two perfectly
correlated MAC channels to the eavesdropper. This fact leads to higher achievable secrecy
rates by the ESA scheme. The second improvement of the ESA scheme with respect to the
SBA scheme is that the average power constraints associated with the ESA scheme do not
involve any channel coefficients whereas those associated with the SBA scheme involve the
gains of the eavesdropper channel which in turn result in inefficient use of transmit powers.
In addition, we introduce an improved version of our second scheme in which we use
cooperative jamming on top of the ESA scheme to achieve higher secrecy rates. Moreover,
since the rate expressions achieved by the ESA scheme (with and without cooperative jam-
ming) and their associated average power constraints are simpler than their counterparts in
the SBA scheme, we derive the necessary conditions on the optimal power allocations that
maximize the sum secrecy rate achieved by the ESA scheme when used alone and when used
together with cooperative jamming. Since the achievable secrecy sum rate, in general, is not
a concave function in the power allocation policy, the solution of such optimization problem
may not be unique. Hence, we obtain a power allocation policy that satisfies the necessary
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(but not necessarily sufficient) KKT conditions of optimality.
Finally, we provide numerical examples that illustrate the scaling of the sum rates
achieved by the proposed schemes with SNR and the saturation of the secrecy sum rate
achieved by the i.i.d. Gaussian signaling scheme with cooperative jamming. We also give
numerical examples for the secrecy sum rates achieved by the ESA scheme with and without
cooperative jamming when power control is used.
2 System Model
We consider the two-user fading multiple access channel with an external eavesdropper.
Transmitter k chooses a messageWk from a set of equally likely messagesWk = {1, ..., 22nRk},
k = 1, 2. Every transmitter encodes its message into a codeword of length 2n symbols. The
channel output at the intended receiver and the eavesdropper are given by
Y =h1X1 + h2X2 +N (1)
Z =g1X1 + g2X2 +N
′ (2)
where, for k = 1, 2, Xk is the input signal at transmitter k, hk is the channel coefficient
between transmitter k and the intended receiver, gk is the channel coefficient between trans-
mitter k and the eavesdropper. We assume a fast fading scenario where the channel coef-
ficients randomly vary from one symbol to another in i.i.d. fashion. Also, we assume the
independence of all channel coefficients h1, h2, g1, and g2. Each of the channel coefficients is
a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with zero-mean. The variances of
hk and gk are σ
2
hk
and σ2gk , respectively. Hence, |hk|
2 and |gk|2 are exponentially distributed
random variables with mean σ2hk and σ
2
gk
, respectively. Moreover, we assume that all the
channel coefficients are known to all the nodes in a causal fashion. In (1)-(2), N and N ′
are the independent Gaussian noises at the intended receiver and the eavesdropper, respec-
tively, and are i.i.d. (in time) circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with
zero-mean and unit-variance. Moreover, we have the usual average power constraints
E[|Xk|
2] ≤ P¯k, k = 1, 2. (3)
3 Previously Known Results
Here we summarize previously known results that are relevant to our development. For
the general discrete-time memoryless MAC-WT, the best known achievable secrecy rate
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region [7], [8], [9] is given by the convex hull of all rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(V1; Y |V2)− I(V1;Z) (4)
R2 ≤ I(V2; Y |V1)− I(V2;Z) (5)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1, V2; Y )− I(V1, V2;Z) (6)
where the distribution p(x1, x2, v1, v2, y, z) factors as p(v1)p(x1|v1)p(v2)p(x2|v2)p(y, z|x1, x2).
Known secrecy rate regions for the Gaussian MAC-WT can be obtained from these
expressions by appropriate selections for the involved random variables. For instance, the
Gaussian signaling based achievable rates proposed in [7] are obtained by choosing X1 = V1
and X2 = V2, i.e., no channel prefixing, and by choosing X1 and X2 to be Gaussian with full
power. On the other hand, cooperative jamming based achievable rates proposed in [8] are
obtained by choosing X1 = V1 + T1 and X2 = V2 + T2, and then by choosing V1, V2, T1, T2
to be independent Gaussian random variables [9]. Here, V1 and V2 carry messages, while T1
and T2 are jamming signals. The powers of (V1, T1) and (V2, T2) should be chosen to satisfy
the power constraints of users 1 and 2, respectively. These selections yield the following
achievable rate region for the Gaussian MAC-WT [8]
R1 ≤ log
(
1 +
|h1|2P1
1 + |h1|2Q1 + |h2|2Q2
)
− log
(
1 +
|g1|2P1
1 + |g1|2Q1 + |g2|2(P2 +Q2)
)
(7)
R2 ≤ log
(
1 +
|h2|2P2
1 + |h1|2Q1 + |h2|2Q2
)
− log
(
1 +
|g2|2P2
1 + |g1|2(P1 +Q1) + |g2|2Q2
)
(8)
R1 +R2 ≤ log
(
1 +
|h1|2P1 + |h2|2P2
1 + |h1|2Q1 + |h2|2Q2
)
− log
(
1 +
|g1|2P1 + |g2|2P2
1 + |g1|2Q1 + |g2|2Q2
)
(9)
where the powers of the signals must satisfy
Pk +Qk ≤ P¯k, k = 1, 2 (10)
where Pk and Qk are the transmission and jamming powers, respectively, of user k.
The ergodic secrecy rate region achieved by Gaussian signaling and cooperative jamming
for the fading MAC-WT can be expressed similarly by simply including expectations over
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fading channel states [16]
R1 ≤ Eh,g
{
log
(
1 +
|h1|
2P1
1 + |h1|2Q1 + |h2|2Q2
)
− log
(
1 +
|g1|
2P1
1 + |g1|2Q1 + |g2|2(P2 + Q2)
)}
(11)
R2 ≤ Eh,g
{
log
(
1 +
|h2|2P2
1 + |h1|2Q1 + |h2|2Q2
)
− log
(
1 +
|g2|2P2
1 + |g1|2(P1 +Q1) + |g2|2Q2
)}
(12)
R1 +R2 ≤ Eh,g
{
log
(
1 +
|h1|2P1 + |h2|2P2
1 + |h1|2Q1 + |h2|2Q2
)
− log
(
1 +
|g1|2P1 + |g2|2P2
1 + |g1|2Q1 + |g2|2Q2
)}
(13)
where h = [h1 h2]
T , g = [g1 g2]
T , and the instantaneous powers Pk and Qk, which are both
functions of h and g, satisfy
E [Pk +Qk] ≤ P¯k, k = 1, 2 (14)
4 Scaling Based Alignment (SBA)
In this section, we introduce a new achievable scheme for the fading MAC-WT. Our achiev-
able scheme is based on code repetition with proper scaling of the signals transmitted by each
transmitter. This is done as follows. For the channel described in (1)-(2), we use a repetition
code such that each transmitter repeats its channel input symbol twice over two consecutive
time instants. Due to code repetition, we may regard each of the MACs to the main receiver
and to the eavesdropper as a vector MAC composed of two parallel scalar MACs, one for the
odd time instants and the other for the even time instants. Consequently, we may describe
the main receiver MAC channel by the following pair of equations
Yo = h1oX1 + h2oX2 +No (15)
Ye = h1eX1 + h2eX2 +Ne (16)
where, for k = 1, 2, hko, hke are the coefficients of the kth main receiver channel in odd
and even time instants, Yo, Ye and No, Ne are the received signal and the noise at the main
receiver in odd and even time instants. In the same way, we may describe the eavesdropper
MAC channel by the following pair of equations
Zo = g1oX1 + g2oX2 +N
′
o (17)
Ze = g1eX1 + g2eX2 +N
′
e (18)
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where, for k = 1, 2, gko, gke are the coefficients of the kth eavesdropper channel in odd and
even time instants, Zo, Ze andNo, Ne are the received signal and the noise at the eavesdropper
in odd and even time instants.
Since all the channel gains are known to all nodes in a causal fashion, the two transmitters
use this knowledge as follows. In every symbol instant, each transmitter scales its transmit
signal with the gain of the other transmitter’s channel to the eavesdropper. That is, in every
symbol duration, the first user multiplies its channel input with g2, the channel gain of the
second user to the eavesdropper, and the second user multiplies its channel input with g1,
the channel gain of the first user to the eavesdropper. Hence the main receiver MAC can be
described as
Yo = h1og2oX1 + h2og1oX2 +No (19)
Ye = h1eg2eX1 + h2eg1eX2 +Ne (20)
and the eavesdropper MAC can be described as
Zo = g1og2oX1 + g1og2oX2 +N
′
o (21)
Ze = g1eg2eX1 + g2eg2eX2 +N
′
e (22)
It is clear from (19)-(20) that the space of the received signal (without noise, i.e., high SNR)
of the main receiver over the two consecutive time instants is two-dimensional almost surely.
In other words, the channel matrix of the main receiver vector MAC is full-rank almost
surely. This is due to the fact that the channel coefficients are drawn from continuous
bounded distributions. On the other hand, it is clear from (21)-(22) that the channel matrix
of the eavesdropper vector MAC is unit-rank. That is, the two ingredients of our scheme,
i.e., code repetition and signal scaling, let the interfering signals at the main receiver live
in a two-dimensional space, while they align the interfering signals at the eavesdropper in a
one-dimensional space. As we will show in the Section 6, these properties play a central role
in achieving secrecy rates that scale with SNR. Finally, we note that, due to signal scaling
at the transmitters, the average power constraints become
E
[(
|g2o|
2 + |g2e|
2
)
P1
]
≤ P¯1 (23)
E
[(
|g1o|
2 + |g1e|
2
)
P2
]
≤ P¯2 (24)
where P1 and P2, which are functions of the channel gains, are the instantaneous powers of
users 1 and 2, respectively.
Now, we evaluate the secrecy rate region achievable by our scaling based alignment (SBA)
scheme. Given the vector channels (19)-(20) and (21)-(22), the following secrecy rates are
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achievable [7], [8], [9],
R1 ≤
1
2
[I(X1; Yo, Ye|X2,h, g)− I(X1;Zo, Ze|h, g)] (25)
R2 ≤
1
2
[I(X2; Yo, Ye|X1,h, g)− I(X2;Zo, Ze|h, g)] (26)
R1 +R2 ≤
1
2
[I(X1, X2; Yo, Ye|h, g)− I(X1, X2;Zo, Ze|h, g)] (27)
These expressions for achievable rates follow from (4)-(6) by treating channel states as out-
puts at the receivers, and noting the independence of channel inputs and channel states. We
note that the factor of 1/2 on the right hand sides of (25)-(27) is due to repetition coding.
Now, by computing (25)-(27) with Gaussian signals, we obtain the secrecy rate region given
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For the two-user fading MAC-WT, the rate region given by all rate pairs
(R1, R2) satisfying the following constraints is achievable with perfect secrecy
R1 ≤
1
2
Eh,g
{
log
(
1 + (|h1og2o|
2 + |h1eg2e|
2)P1
)
− log
(
1 +
(|g1og2o|
2 + |g1eg2e|
2)P1
1 + (|g1og2o|2 + |g1eg2e|2)P2
)}
(28)
R2 ≤
1
2
Eh,g
{
log
(
1 + (|h2og1o|
2 + |h2eg1e|
2)P2
)
− log
(
1 +
(|g1og2o|2 + |g1eg2e|2)P2
1 + (|g1og2o|2 + |g1eg2e|2)P1
)}
(29)
R1 +R2 ≤
1
2
Eh,g
{
log
(
1 +
(
|h1og2o|
2 + |h1eg2e|
2
)
P1 +
(
|h2og1o|
2 + |h2eg1e|
2
)
P2
+ |h1eh2og1og2e − h1oh2eg1eg2o|
2P1P2
)
− log
(
1 +
(
|g1og2o|
2 + |g1eg2e|
2
)
(P1 + P2)
)}
(30)
where h = [h1o h1e h2o h2e]
T , g = [g1o g1e g2o g2e]
T , and P1, P2, which are functions of
ho = [h1o h2o]
T and go = [g1o g2o]
T , are the power allocation policies of users 1 and 2,
respectively, that satisfy
E
[(
|g2o|
2 + |g2e|
2
)
P1
]
≤ P¯1 (31)
E
[(
|g1o|
2 + |g1e|
2
)
P2
]
≤ P¯2 (32)
where P¯1 and P¯2 are the average power constraints.
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5 Ergodic Secret Alignment (ESA)
After we have devised the scaling based alignment scheme, the ergodic interference alignment
scheme of Nazer et. al. [17] inspired us to propose an improved achievable scheme. In
this section, we discuss this scheme which we call ergodic secret alignment (ESA). The
new ingredient in this scheme is to perform repetition coding at two carefully chosen time
instances as opposed to two consecutive time instances as we have done in Section 4.
For the MAC-WT described by (1)-(2), we use a repetition code in a way similar to
the one in [17]. Indeed, we repeat each code symbol in the time instant that holds certain
channel conditions relative to the those conditions in the time instant where this code symbol
is first transmitted. Namely, given a time instant with the main receiver channel state vector
h = [h1 h2]
T and the eavesdropper channel state vector g = [g1 g2]
T , where the symbols X1
and X2 are first transmitted by the two transmitters, we will solve for the channel states
h˜ = [h˜1 h˜2]
T and g˜ = [g˜1 g˜2]
T , where these symbols should be repeated again, such that the
resulting secrecy rates achieved by Gaussian signaling are maximized.
Due to code repetition, we may regard each of the MACs to the main receiver and to
the eavesdropper as a vector MAC composed of two parallel scalar MACs, one for each one
of the two time instants over which the same code symbols X1 and X2 are transmitted.
Consequently, we may describe the main receiver MAC channel by the following pair of
equations
Y1 = h1X1 + h2X2 +N1 (33)
Y2 = h˜1X1 + h˜2X2 +N2 (34)
where Y1, Y2 and N1, N2 are the received symbols and the noise at the main receiver in the
two time instants of code repetition. In the same way, we may describe the eavesdropper
MAC channel by the following pair of equations
Z1 = g1X1 + g2X2 +N
′
1 (35)
Z2 = g˜1X1 + g˜2X2 +N
′
2 (36)
where Z1, Z2 and N
′
1, N
′
2 are the received symbols and the noise at the eavesdropper in the
two time instants of code repetition.
In the next theorem, we give another achievable secrecy rate region for the two-user
fading MAC-WT. The achievable region is obtained using (25)-(27) and replacing (Yo, Ye)
and (Zo, Ze) with (Y1, Y2) and (Z1, Z2), respectively, and evaluating these expressions with
Gaussian signals, and by choosing optimal h˜ = (h˜1, h˜2) and g˜ = (g˜1, g˜2) to maximize the
achievable rates. In particular, we choose the repetition instants, i.e., h˜ and g˜, in such a way
that the parallel MAC to the main receiver is the most favorable from the main transmitter-
receiver pair’s point of view, and the parallel MAC to the eavesdropper is the least favorable
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from the eavesdropper’s point of view. As we will show shortly as a result of Theorem 2,
this optimal selection will yield an orthogonal MAC to the main receiver and a scalar MAC
to the eavesdropper. In writing the achievable rate expressions, we will again account for
code repetition by multiplying achievable rates by a factor of 1/2.
Theorem 2 For the two-user fading MAC-WT, the rate region given by all rate pairs
(R1, R2) satisfying the following constraints is achievable with perfect secrecy
R1 ≤
1
2
Eh,g
{
log
(
1 + 2|h1|
2P1
)
− log
(
1 +
2|g1|2P1
1 + 2|g2|2P2
)}
(37)
R2 ≤
1
2
Eh,g
{
log
(
1 + 2|h2|
2P2
)
− log
(
1 +
2|g2|
2P2
1 + 2|g1|2P1
)}
(38)
R1 +R2 ≤
1
2
Eh,g
{
log
(
1 + 2|h1|
2P1
)
+ log
(
1 + 2|h2|
2P2
)
− log
(
1 + 2(|g1|
2P1 + |g2|
2P2)
)}
(39)
where P1 and P2 are the power allocation policies of users 1 and 2, respectively, and are both
functions of h and g in general. In addition, they satisfy the average power constraints
E[P1] ≤ P¯1 (40)
E[P2] ≤ P¯2 (41)
Proof: First, consider the two vector MACs given by (33)-(36). Observe that as in [17],
h˜ must be chosen such that it has the same distribution as h and g˜ must be chosen such
that it has the same distribution as g. Since h ∼ CN (0,Bh) and g ∼ CN (0,Bg) where
Bh = diag(σ
2
h1
, σ2h2) and Bg = diag(σ
2
g1
, σ2g2), then h˜ and g˜ must be in the form h˜ = Uh
and g˜ = Vg where the unitary matrices U and V must further be of the form: U =
diag(exp(jθ1), exp(jθ2)) and V = diag(exp(jω1), exp(jω2)) for some θ1, θ2, ω1, ω2 ∈ [0, 2pi).
Then, it follows that (33)-(36) can be written as
Y1 = h1X1 + h2X2 +N1 (42)
Y2 = h1e
jθ1X1 + h2e
jθ2X2 +N2 (43)
Z1 = g1X1 + g2X2 +N
′
1 (44)
Z2 = g1e
jω1X1 + g2e
jω2X2 +N
′
2 (45)
Using (25)-(27) and replacing (Yo, Ye) and (Zo, Ze) with (Y1, Y2) and (Z1, Z2), respectively,
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and computing these achievable rates with Gaussian signals, we get
R1 ≤
1
2
Eh,g
{
log
(
1 + 2|h1|
2P1
)
− log
(
1 +
2|g1|2P1 + 2(1− cos(ω))|g1|2|g2|2P1P2
1 + 2|g2|2P2
)}
(46)
R2 ≤
1
2
Eh,g
{
log
(
1 + 2|h2|
2P2
)
− log
(
1 +
2|g2|2P2 + 2(1− cos(ω))|g1|2|g2|2P1P2
1 + 2|g1|2P1
)}
(47)
R1 +R2 ≤
1
2
Eh,g
{
log(1 + 2|h1|
2P1 + 2|h2|
2P2 + 2(1− cos(θ))|h1|
2|h2|
2P1P2)
− log(1 + 2|g1|
2P1 + 2|g2|
2P2 + 2(1− cos(ω))|g1|
2|g2|
2P1P2)
}
(48)
where θ = θ2 − θ1 and ω = ω2 − ω1.
Hence, the largest achievable secrecy rate region (46)-(48) is attained by choosing θ = pi
and ω = 0. This can be achieved by choosing θ1 = 0 and θ2 = pi and by choosing ω1 = ω2 = 0.
Consequently, we have h˜ = [h1 − h2]T and g˜ = [g1 g2]T . By substituting these values of θ
and ω in (46)-(48), we obtain the region given by (37)-(39). 
Therefore, when using the ergodic secret alignment technique, the best choice for h˜1 and
h˜2 is such that h˜ is orthogonal to h and that ‖h˜‖ = ‖h‖, and the best choice for g˜1 and g˜2
is such that g˜ and g are linearly dependent and that ‖g˜‖ = ‖g‖, i.e., g˜ = g. This choice
makes the vector MAC between the two transmitters and the main receiver equivalent to an
orthogonal MAC, i.e., two independent single-user fading channels, one from each transmitter
to the main receiver. This equivalent main receiver MAC channel can be expressed as
Y¯1 = 2h1X1 + N¯1 (49)
Y¯2 = 2h2X2 + N¯2 (50)
where Y¯1 = Y1 + Y2, Y¯2 = Y1 − Y2, N¯1 = N1 + N2, and N¯2 = N1 − N2. Note that N¯1 and
N¯2 are independent. On the other hand, this choice makes the vector MAC between the
two transmitters and the eavesdropper equivalent to a single scalar MAC. This equivalent
eavesdropper MAC channel can be expressed as
Z¯1 = 2g1X1 + 2g2X2 + N¯
′
1 (51)
Z¯2 = N¯
′
2 (52)
where Z¯1 = Z1 + Z2, Z¯2 = Z1 − Z2, N¯ ′1 = N
′
1 + N
′
2, and N¯
′
2 = N
′
1 − N
′
2. Note again that
N¯1 and N¯2 are independent. Note that, here, the second component of the eavesdropper’s
vector MAC is useless for her (i.e., leaks no further information than the first component) as
it contains only noise. This selection of the repetition channel state yields a most favorable
setting for the main receiver, and a least favorable setting for the eavesdropper.
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6 Degrees of Freedom
In this section, we show that the secrecy sum rates achieved by our schemes scale with SNR
as 1/2 log(SNR) and that the secrecy sum rate achieved by the cooperative jamming scheme
given in [16] does not scale with SNR. What we give here are rigorous proofs for intuitive
results. Since by looking at (30) and (39), one can note that, if we assume that P¯1 = P¯2 = P ,
then if we take P1 = P2 = P , as P becomes large, roughly speaking, in (30) the first term
inside the expectation grows as log(P 2) while the second term grows as log(P ) and hence
the overall expression grows as 1/2 log(P ); and similarly, in (39), all three terms inside the
expectation grow as log(P ) and hence the overall expression grows as 1/2 log(P ). In the
same way, by considering the secrecy sum rate achieved by the cooperative jamming scheme
given in (13), then by referring to the power allocation policies given in [16], one can also
roughly say that for all channel states, as the available average power goes to infinity, the
overall expression converges to a constant.
For simplicity, we assume symmetric average power constraints for all schemes, i.e., we
set P¯1 = P¯2 = P in (31)-(32), (40)-(41), and (14). We also assume that all channel gains are
drawn from continuous bounded distributions and that all channel gains have finite variances.
Let Rs be the achievable secrecy sum rate, then the total number of achievable secure DoF,
η, is defined as
η , lim
P→∞
Rs
log(P )
(53)
We start by the DoF analysis of our proposed schemes, i.e., the SBA scheme and the ESA
scheme, where we show that the sum secrecy rates obtained by these schemes achieve 1/2
secure DoF, then we provide a rigorous proof for the fact that the scheme of [16] which is
based on i.i.d. Gaussian signaling with cooperative jamming achieves a secrecy sum rate
that does not scale with SNR, i.e., achieves zero secure DoF.
6.1 Secure DoF with the SBA Scheme
We make the following choices for the power allocation policies P1 and P2 of the SBA scheme.
We set P1 =
1
2σ2g2
P , P2 =
1
2σ2g1
P . It can be verified that these choices satisfy the power
constraints (31)-(32). Denoting the expression inside the expectation in (30) by fP (h, g),
the secrecy sum rate achieved using the SBA scheme can be written as
Rs =
1
2
Eh,g {fP (h, g)} (54)
Hence, the total achievable secure DoF is given by
η =
1
2
lim
P→∞
Eh,g
[
fP (h, g)
log(P )
]
(55)
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Now, we show that, for the two-user fading MAC-WT, a total number of secure DoF
η = 1/2 is achievable with the SBA scheme. Towards this end, it suffices to show that the
order of the limit and the expectation in (55) can be reversed. To do this, we make use of
Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem. Now, we note that for large enough P , fP (h,g)
log(P )
is
upper bounded by ψ(h, g) where
ψ(h, g) =4 + 2
(
log
(
1 +
1
σ2g1
)
+ log
(
1 +
1
σ2g2
))
+ log
(
1 +
σ2g1 + σ
2
g2
σ2g1σ
2
g2
)
+ 3
(
2∑
k=1
log(1 + |hko|
2) +
2∑
k=1
log(1 + |hke|
2)
)
+ 4
(
2∑
k=1
log(1 + |gko|
2) +
2∑
k=1
log(1 + |gke|
2)
)
(56)
Hence, using the fact that all channel gains have finite variances together with Jensen’s
inequality, we have
Eh,g [ψ(h, g)] <∞ (57)
Thus, by the dominated convergence theorem, we have
lim
P→∞
Eh,g
[
fP (h, g)
log(P )
]
= Eh,g
[
lim
P→∞
fP (h, g)
log(P )
]
= 1 (58)
Hence, from (55), we have η = 1/2.
6.2 Secure DoF with the ESA Scheme
We show that the ESA scheme achieves η = 1/2 secure DoF in the two-user fading MAC-
WT. Here, we also use a constant power allocation policy for the ESA scheme where we set
P1 = P2 = P for all channel states. Clearly, this constant policy satisfies the average power
constraints (40)-(41). Denoting the expression inside the expectation in (39) by f˜P (h, g),
the achievable secrecy sum rate, Rs is given by
Rs =
1
2
Eh,g
{
f˜P (h, g)
}
(59)
Hence, the total achievable secure DoF is given by
η =
1
2
lim
P→∞
Eh,g
[
f˜P (h, g)
log(P )
]
(60)
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We note that for large enough P , f˜P (h,g)
log(P )
≤ ψ˜(h, g) where
ψ˜(h, g) = 6 + log
(
1 + 2|h1|
2
)
+ log
(
1 + 2|h2|
2
)
+ log
(
1 + 2
(
|g1|
2 + |g2|
2
))
(61)
Again, using the fact that all channel gains have finite variances together with Jensen’s
inequality, we have
Eh,g
[
ψ˜(h, g)
]
<∞ (62)
Then, by the dominated convergence theorem, we have
lim
P→∞
Eh,g
[
f˜P (h, g)
log(P )
]
= Eh,g
[
lim
P→∞
f˜P (h, g)
log(P )
]
= 1 (63)
Hence, from (60), we have η = 1/2.
6.3 Secure DoF with i.i.d. Gaussian Signaling with CJ
We consider the secrecy sum rate achieved by Gaussian signaling with cooperative jamming
(CJ) [16] in the fading MAC-WT and show that this achievable rate does not scale with
SNR. We start with the secrecy sum rate given by the right hand side of (13). According to
the optimal power allocation policy described in [16], for k = 1, 2, we cannot have Pk > 0
and Qk > 0 simultaneously. Moreover, no transmission occurs when |h1| ≤ |g1| and |h2| ≤
|g2|. Consequently, according to the relative values of the channel gains (|h1|, |h2|, |g1|, |g2|),
there are three different cases left for the instantaneous secrecy sum rate achieved using the
optimum power allocation where we omitted the case where |h1| ≤ |g1| and |h2| ≤ |g2| since
no transmission is allowed.
Case 1: (h, g) ∈ D1 where D1 =
{
(h, g) : |h1| > |g1|, |h2| > |g2|
}
. Consequently,
Q1 = Q2 = 0. Thus, the instantaneous secrecy sum rate, Rs(h, g), can be written as
Rs(h, g) = log
(
1 + |h1|2P1 + |h2|2P2
1 + |g1|2P1 + |g2|2P2
)
(64)
We can upper bound Rs(h, g) as
Rs(h, g) ≤ log
(
1 +
|h1|2
|g1|2
+
|h2|2
|g2|2
)
≤ log
(
1 +
|h1|2
|g1|2
)
+ log
(
1 +
|h2|2
|g2|2
)
(65)
Case 2: (h, g) ∈ D2 where D2 =
{
(h, g) : |h1| > |g1|, |h2| < |g2|
}
. Consequently,
Q1 = P2 = 0. Thus, the instantaneous secrecy sum rate, Rs(h, g), can be written as
Rs(h, g) = log
(
1 + |h1|2P1 + |h2|2Q2
1 + |g1|2P1 + |g2|2Q2
)
+ log
(
1 + |g2|2Q2
1 + |h2|2Q2
)
(66)
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We can upper bound Rs(h, g) as
Rs(h, g) ≤ 1 + log
(
1 +
|h1|
2
|g1|2
)
+ log
(
1 +
|g2|
2
|h2|2
)
(67)
Case 3: (h, g) ∈ D3 where D3 =
{
(h, g) : |h1| < |g1|, |h2| > |g2|
}
. Consequently,
P1 = Q2 = 0. Thus, the instantaneous secrecy sum rate, Rs(h, g), can be written as
Rs(h, g) = log
(
1 + |h1|2Q1 + |h2|2P2
1 + |g1|2Q1 + |g2|2P2
)
+ log
(
1 + |g1|2Q1
1 + |h1|2Q1
)
(68)
We can upper bound Rs(h, g) as
Rs(h, g) ≤ 1 + log
(
1 +
|h2|
2
|g2|2
)
+ log
(
1 +
|g1|
2
|h1|2
)
(69)
Now, since the instantaneous sum rate is zero outside D1 ∪ D2 ∪ D3, then from (65), (67),
and (69), the ergodic secrecy sum rate, Rs, can be upper bounded as follows
Rs ≤
∫
D1
(
log
(
1 +
|h1|2
|g1|2
)
+ log
(
1 +
|h2|2
|g2|2
))
dF
+
∫
D2
(
1 + log
(
1 +
|h1|2
|g1|2
)
+ log
(
1 +
|g2|2
|h2|2
))
dF
+
∫
D3
(
1 + log
(
1 +
|h2|2
|g2|2
)
+ log
(
1 +
|g1|2
|h1|2
))
dF (70)
where
dF =
2∏
k=1
f(|hk|
2)f(|gk|
2)d|hk|
2d|gk|
2 (71)
where, for k = 1, 2, f(|hk|2) and f(|gk|2) are the density functions of |hk|2 and |gk|2, respec-
tively. Now, since E[|hk|2] < ∞, E[|gk|2] < ∞ for k = 1, 2, |
∫ 1
0
log(x)dx| = log(e) < ∞,
|
∫ 1
0
log(1 + x)dx| = 2 − log(e) < ∞, and f(|hk|2), f(|gk|2) are continuous and bounded for
k = 1, 2, it follows that each of the three integrals in the above expression is finite. Hence,
we have Rs < ∞, and that Rs is bounded from above by a constant. Thus, from definition
(53) of the achievable secure DoF, η, we have
η = lim
P→∞
Rs
log(P )
= 0 (72)
7 ESA Scheme with Cooperative Jamming
The result given in Theorem 2 can be strengthened by adding the technique of cooperative
jamming to the ESA scheme of Section 5. We refer to the resulting scheme as ESA/CJ.
This is done through Gaussian channel prefixing as discussed in Section 3. In particular,
we choose the channel inputs in (33)-(36) to be X1 = V1 + T1 and X2 = V2 + T2, and then
choose V1, V2, T1, T2 to be independent Gaussian random variables. Here, V1 and V2 carry
messages, while T1 and T2 are jamming signals. The powers of (V1, T1) and (V2, T2) should
be chosen to satisfy the average power constraints of users 1 and 2, respectively. These
selections when made in the ESA scheme yield the following achievable rate region which,
through appropriate power control strategy (see Section 9), can be made strictly larger than
the region given in Theorem 2,
R1 ≤
1
2
Eh,g
{
log
(
1 +
2|h1|2P1
1 + 2|h1|2Q1
)
− log
(
1 +
2|g1|2P1
1 + 2|g1|2Q1 + 2|g2|2(P2 +Q2)
)}
(73)
R2 ≤
1
2
Eh,g
{
log
(
1 +
2|h2|2P2
1 + 2|h2|2Q2
)
− log
(
1 +
2|g2|2P2
1 + 2|g1|2(P1 +Q1) + 2|g2|2Q2
)}
(74)
R1 +R2 ≤
1
2
Eh,g
{
log
(
1 +
2|h1|2P1
1 + 2|h1|2Q1
)
+ log
(
1 +
2|h2|2P2
1 + 2|h2|2Q2
)
− log
(
1 +
2(|g1|2P1 + |g2|2P2)
1 + 2(|g1|2Q1 + |g2|2Q2)
)}
(75)
where, for k = 1, 2, Pk and Qk are the transmission and jamming powers, respectively, of
user k, and are both functions of h and g in general. In addition, they satisfy the average
power constraints
E[Pk +Qk] ≤ P¯k, k = 1, 2 (76)
8 Maximizing Secrecy Sum Rate of the ESA Scheme
In this section, we consider the problem of maximizing the secrecy sum rate achieved by the
ESA scheme as a function of the power allocations P1 and P2 of users 1 and 2, respectively.
For notational convenience, we replace 2|hk|2 and 2|gk|2 in the achievable rates (37)-(39) by
hk and gk, respectively. Then, we define h , [h1 h2]
T and g , [g1 g2]
T . The achievable
secrecy sum rate is given by
Rs =
1
2
Eh,g{log (1 + h1P1) + log (1 + h2P2)− log (1 + g1P1 + g2P2)} (77)
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We can write the optimization problem as
max Eh,g{log (1 + h1P1) + log (1 + h2P2)− log (1 + g1P1 + g2P2)} (78)
s.t. Eh,g [Pk(h, g)] ≤ P¯k, k = 1, 2 (79)
Pk(h, g) ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, ∀h, g (80)
The necessary KKT optimality conditions are
h1
1 + h1P1
−
g1
1 + g1P1 + g2P2
− (λ1 − µ1) = 0 (81)
h2
1 + h2P2
−
g2
1 + g1P1 + g2P2
− (λ2 − µ2) = 0 (82)
It should be noted here that (81)-(82) are only necessary conditions for the optimal power
allocations P1 and P2 since the objective function, i.e., the achievable secrecy sum rate, is
not concave in (P1, P2) in general.
For each channel state, we distinguish between three non-zero forms that the solution
(P1, P2) of (81)-(82) may take. First, if P1 > 0 and P2 > 0, then µ1 = µ2 = 0. Hence (P1, P2)
is the positive common root of the following two quadratic equations
h1 (1 + g2P2)− g1 = λ1 (1 + h1P1) (1 + g1P1 + g2P2) (83)
h2 (1 + g1P1)− g2 = λ2 (1 + h2P2) (1 + g1P1 + g2P2) (84)
Since it is hard to find a simple closed-form solution for the above system of equations, we
solve this system numerically and obtain the positive common root (P1, P2). Secondly, if
P1 > 0 and P2 = 0, then µ1 = 0. Hence, from (81), P1 is given by
P1 =
1
2


√(
1
g1
−
1
h1
)2
+
4
λ1
(
1
g1
−
1
h1
)
−
(
1
g1
+
1
h1
) (85)
Thirdly, if P1 = 0 and P2 > 0, then µ2 = 0. Hence, from (82), P2 is given by
P2 =
1
2


√(
1
g2
−
1
h2
)2
+
4
λ2
(
1
g2
−
1
h2
)
−
(
1
g2
+
1
h2
) (86)
From conditions (81)-(82), we can derive the following necessary and sufficient conditions
for the positivity of the optimal power allocation policies:
P1 > 0, if and only if h1 −
g1
(1 + g2P2)
> λ1 (87)
P2 > 0, if and only if h2 −
g2
(1 + g1P1)
> λ2 (88)
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Consequently, according to conditions (87)-(88), we can divide the set of all possible channel
states into 7 partitions such that in each partition the solution (P1, P2) will either have one
of the three forms stated above or will be zero. Hence, the power allocation policy (P1, P2)
that satisfies (81)-(82) and (79)-(80) can be fully described in 7 different cases of the channel
gains. The details of such cases are given in Appendix A.
9 Maximizing Secrecy Sum Rate of the ESA/CJ Scheme
In this section, we consider the problem of maximizing the achievable secrecy sum rate as
a function in the power allocation policies P1 and P2 when cooperative jamming technique
is used on top of the ESA scheme. Again, for notational convenience, we replace 2|hk|2
and 2|gk|2 in the achievable rates (73)-(75) by hk and gk, respectively. Then, we define
h , [h1 h2]
T and g , [g1 g2]
T . In this case, the optimization problem is described as
max Eh,g
{
log (1 + h1(P1 +Q1)) + log (1 + h2(P2 +Q2))
− log (1 + g1(P1 +Q1) + g2(P2 +Q2)) + log (1 + g1Q1 + g2Q2)
− log (1 + h1Q1)− log (1 + h2Q2)
}
(89)
s.t. Eh,g [Pk(h, g) +Qk(h, g)] ≤ P¯k, k = 1, 2 (90)
Pk(h, g), Qk(h, g) ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, ∀h, g (91)
We first show that, at any fading state, splitting a user’s power into transmission and
jamming is suboptimal, i.e., an optimum power allocation policy must not have Pk > 0 and
Qk > 0 simultaneously. We note that whether we split powers or not does not affect the first
three terms of the objective function since we can always convert jamming power of user
k into transmission power of the same user and vice versa while keeping the sum Pk + Qk
fixed. Hence, we consider the last three terms of the sum rate. For convenience, we define
S = log (1 + g1Q1 + g2Q2)− log (1 + h1Q1)− log (1 + h2Q2) (92)
Consider, without loss of generality, the power allocation for user 1. We assume that P ∗1 , Q
∗
1
is the optimum power allocation for user 1. We observe that the sign of
∂S
∂Q1
=
g1
1 + g1Q1 + g2Q2
−
h1
1 + h1Q1
(93)
does not depend on Q1. Consider a power allocation P1 = P
∗
1 − α,Q1 = Q
∗
1 + α. Hence,
we have P1 + Q1 = P
∗
1 + Q
∗
1 and the first three terms in the expression of the achievable
sum rate do not change. On the other hand, if (93) is positive, any positive α results in an
increase in the achievable sum rate and jamming with the same sum power is better. While,
if (93) is negative, then any negative α results in an increase in the achievable sum rate and
19
transmitting with the same sum power is better. If (93) is zero, then the sum rate does not
depend on Q1 and we can set it to zero, i.e., use the sum power in transmitting. Therefore,
the optimum power allocation will have either Pk > 0 or Qk > 0, but not both.
Suppose that P1, P2, Q1, and Q2 are the optimal power allocations. Then, the necessary
KKT conditions satisfy
h1
1 + h1(P1 +Q1)
−
g1
1 + g1(P1 +Q1) + g2(P2 +Q2)
− (λ1 − µ1) = 0 (94)
h2
1 + h2(P2 +Q2)
−
g2
1 + g1(P1 +Q1) + g2(P2 +Q2)
− (λ2 − µ2) = 0 (95)
h1
1 + h1(P1 +Q1)
−
g1
1 + g1(P1 +Q1) + g2(P2 +Q2)
+
g1
1 + g1Q1 + g2Q2
−
h1
1 + h1Q1
− (λ1 − ν1) = 0 (96)
h2
1 + h2(P2 +Q2)
−
g2
1 + g1(P1 +Q1) + g2(P2 +Q2)
+
g2
1 + g1Q1 + g2Q2
−
h2
1 + h2Q2
− (λ2 − ν2) = 0 (97)
As in Section 8, we note that (94)-(97) are only necessary conditions for the optimal power
allocations P1, P2, Q1, and Q2 since the objective function, i.e., the achievable secrecy sum
rate, is not concave in (P1, P2, Q1, Q2) in general. Therefore, we give power control policies
P1, P2, Q1, and Q2 that satisfy these necessary conditions. That is, we obtain one fixed
point (P1, P2, Q1, Q2) of the Lagrangian such that (P1, P2, Q1, Q2) satisfies the constraints
(90)-(91). The power allocation policy (P1, P2, Q1, Q2) that satisfies (94)-(97) and (90)-(91)
is described in detail in Appendix B.
10 Numerical Results
In this section, we present some simple simulation results. We also plot the sum secrecy
rate achieved using our SBA and ESA schemes, as well as the i.i.d. Gaussian signaling with
cooperative jamming (GS/CJ) scheme in [16]. First, the secrecy sum rates achieved by the
SBA and the ESA schemes scale with SNR. Hence, these rates exceed the one achieved by
the GS/CJ scheme for high SNR. Second, the secrecy sum rate achieved by the ESA scheme
is larger than the one achieved by the SBA scheme for all SNR.
In our first set of simulations, we use a rudimentary power allocation policy for our SBA
and ESA schemes. For the SBA scheme, we first note, from (30), that the secrecy sum rate
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achieved can be expressed as a nested expectation as
Rs =
1
2
Eho,go
{
Ehe,ge
[
log
(
1 +
(
|h1og2o|
2 + |h1eg2e|
2
)
P1 +
(
|h2og1o|
2 + |h2eg1e|
2
)
P2
+ |h1eh2og1og2e − h1oh2eg1eg2o|
2P1P2
)
− log
(
1 +
(
|g1og2o|
2 + |g1eg2e|
2
)
(P1 + P2)
)]}
(98)
where ho = [h1o h2o]
T , he = [h1e h2e]
T , go = [g1o g2o]
T , and ge = [g1e g2e]
T . For those
channel gains ho, go for which the inner expectation with respect to he, ge is negative, we
set P1 = P2 = 0. Otherwise, we set P1 =
1
2σ2g
P¯1 and P2 =
1
2σ2g
P¯2. Note that turning off the
powers for some values of the channel gains ho, go is possible since P1 and P2 are functions of
ho and go. Secondly, note that, if a power allocation satisfies the average power constraints,
then the modified power allocation where the powers are turned off at some channel states,
also satisfies the power constraints. For the ESA scheme, we first note, from (39), that the
achievable secrecy sum rate is
Rs =
1
2
Eh,g
{
log
(
1 + 2|h1|
2P1
)
+ log
(
1 + 2|h2|
2P2
)
− log
(
1 + 2(|g1|
2P1 + |g2|
2P2)
)}
(99)
In this case, we set P1 = P2 = 0 for those values of channel gains for which the difference
inside the expectation is negative. Otherwise, we set P1 = P¯1 and P2 = P¯2. Again, turning
the powers off does not violate power constraints for a power allocation scheme which already
satisfies the power constraints. For the GS/CJ scheme, we use the power allocation scheme
described in [16].
In Figure 1, the secrecy sum rate achieved by each of the three schemes is plotted versus
the average SNR that we define as 1
2
(P¯1 + P¯2). In all simulations, we set σ
2
h1
= σ2h2 = 1.0,
we also take σ2g1 = σ
2
g2
= 0.75.
Next, in Figure 2, we plot secrecy sum rates achievable with constant power allocation
together with secrecy sum rates achievable with power control for the ESA scheme with and
without cooperative jamming.
11 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed two new achievable schemes for the fading multiple access wiretap
channel. Our first scheme, the scaling based alignment (SBA) scheme, lets the interfering
signals at the main receiver live in a two-dimensional space, while it aligns the interfering
signals at the eavesdropper in a one-dimensional space. We obtained the secrecy rate region
achieved by this scheme. We showed that the secrecy rates achieved by this scheme scale
with SNR as 1/2 log(SNR), i.e., a total of 1/2 secure DoF is achievable in the two-user fading
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Figure 1: Achievable secrecy sum-rates of the scaling based alignment scheme (SBA scheme)
of this paper, the ergodic secret alignment scheme (ESA scheme) of this paper, and the i.i.d.
Gaussian signaling with cooperative jamming scheme (GS/CJ scheme) of [16], as function
of the SNR for two different values of mean eavesdropper channel gain, σ2g .
MAC-WT. We also showed that the secrecy sum rate achieved by the i.i.d. Gaussian signaling
with cooperative jamming scheme does not scale with SNR, i.e., the achievable secure DoF is
zero. As a direct consequence, we showed the sub-optimality of the i.i.d. Gaussian signaling
based schemes with or without cooperative jamming in the fading MAC-WT.
Our second scheme, the ergodic secret alignment (ESA) scheme, is inspired by the ergodic
interference alignment technique. In this scheme each transmitter repeats its symbols over
carefully chosen time instants such that the interfering signals from the transmitters are
aligned favorably at the main receiver while they are aligned unfavorably at the eavesdropper.
We obtained the secrecy rate region achieved by this scheme and showed that, as in the scaling
based alignment scheme, the secrecy sum rate achieved by the ergodic secret alignment
scheme scales with SNR as 1/2 log(SNR). In addition, we introduced an improved version of
our ESA scheme where cooperative jamming is used as an additional ingredient to achieve
higher secrecy rates. Moreover, since the rate expressions achieved with the SBA scheme
seem complicated, while the rate expressions achieved with the two versions of the ESA
scheme (with and without cooperative jamming) are more amenable for optimization of
power allocations, we derived the necessary conditions for the optimal power allocation that
maximizes the secrecy sum rate achieved by the ESA scheme when used solely and when
used with cooperative jamming.
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Figure 2: Achievable secrecy sum rates for the ergodic secret alignment scheme (ESA scheme)
of this paper, with and without power control, the ergodic secret alignment with cooperative
jamming scheme (ESA/CJ scheme) of this paper with power control, and the i.i.d. Gaussian
signaling with cooperative jamming scheme (GS/CJ scheme) of [16], as function of the SNR
for two different values of mean eavesdropper channel gain, σ2g .
Appendices
A Power Control for the ESA Scheme
Here, we discuss the cases of the power allocation policy of Section 8.
1. h1 ≤ λ1, h2 − g2 ≤ λ2 or h1 − g1 ≤ λ1, h2 ≤ λ2. In this case, P1 = P2 = 0. To
prove this, suppose without loss of generality that h1 ≤ λ1, h2 − g2 ≤ λ2. We note
that h1 ≤ λ1 implies that h1 −
g1
(1+g2P2)
≤ λ1 which, using (87), implies that P1 = 0.
Hence, from (88), we must also have P2 = 0. In the same way, we can show that when
h1 − g1 ≤ λ1, h2 ≤ λ2, we also must have P1 = P2 = 0.
2. h1 ≤ λ1, h2 − g2 > λ2. In this case, P1 = 0 and P2 > 0 where P2 is given by (86). As
in the previous case, h1 ≤ λ1, using (87), implies that P1 = 0. Hence, from (88), we
must have P2 > 0.
3. h1 − g1 > λ1, h2 ≤ λ2. In this case, P1 > 0 and P2 = 0 where P1 is given by (85). This
case is the same as the previous one with roles of users 1 and 2 interchanged.
4. λ1 < h1 ≤ λ1 + g1, λ2 < h2 ≤ λ2 + g2. In this case, the solution (P1, P2) may not be
unique. Namely, we either have P1 > 0 and P2 > 0, or we have P1 = P2 = 0. This is
due to the following facts. It is easy to see that P1 = P2 = 0 satisfies h1−
g1
(1+g2P2)
≤ λ1
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and h2−
g2
(1+g1P1)
≤ λ2, i.e., satisfies conditions (87) and (88). It is also easy to see that
we can find positive P1 and P2 such that h1 −
g1
(1+g2P2)
> λ1 and h2 −
g2
(1+g1P1)
> λ2,
i.e., there exist positive P1 and P2 that satisfy (87) and (88). Hence the solution
(P1, P2) may not be unique. It remains to show that we cannot have P1 > 0, P2 = 0
or P1 = 0, P2 > 0. Suppose without loss of generality that P1 > 0, P2 = 0. Hence, we
have h1 −
g1
(1+g2P2)
= h1 − g1 ≤ λ1 which implies that P1 = 0 which is a contradiction.
Thus, we cannot have P1 > 0, P2 = 0. In the same way, it can be shown that we
cannot have P1 = 0, P2 > 0. Hence, we obtain our power allocation policy for this
case as follows. We examine the solution of equations (83)-(84), if it yields a real and
non-negative solution (P1, P2)
1, then we take it as our solution (P1, P2) for this case.
Otherwise, we set P1 = P2 = 0.
5. λ1 < h1 ≤ λ1+ g1, h2−g2 > λ2. In this case, we must have P2 > 0. However, we either
have P1 > 0 or P1 = 0. This can be shown as follows. We note that h2 − g2 > λ2
implies that h2 −
g2
(1+g1P1)
> λ2 for any P1 ≥ 0. Hence, by (88), we must have P2 > 0.
However, we either have P1 > 0 or P1 = 0 depending on whether the value of P2
satisfies h1 −
g1
(1+g2P2)
> λ1 or not. We obtain our power allocation policies as follows.
We first solve (83)-(84), if this yields a real and non-negative solution (P1, P2), then
we take it to be the power allocation values for this case. Otherwise, we set P1 = 0
and P2 is obtained from (86).
6. h1 − g1 > λ1, λ2 < h2 ≤ λ2 + g2. By the symmetry between this case and the previous
case, we must have P1 > 0 while we either have P2 > 0 or P2 = 0. We obtain our
power allocation policies in a fashion similar to that of case 4 and case 5. In particular,
we first solve (83)-(84), if this yields a real and non-negative solution (P1, P2), then we
take it to be the power allocation values for this case. Otherwise, we set P2 = 0 and
P1 is obtained from (85).
7. h1−g1 > λ1, h2−g2 > λ2. Here, we must have P1 > 0 and P2 > 0. This is due to the fact
that h1−g1 > λ1 and h2−g2 > λ2 imply that h1−
g1
(1+g2P2)
> λ1 and h2−
g2
(1+g1P1)
> λ2,
respectively. Hence, from (87)-(88), we must have P1 > 0 and P2 > 0. The values of
P1 and P2 are given by the positive common root (P1, P2) of (83)-(84) which, in this
case, have only one positive common root.
B Power Control for the ESA/CJ Scheme
Here, we discuss the power allocation policy of Section 9.
For each channel state, since splitting power between transmission and jamming is sub-
optimal, we can distinguish between five non-zero forms that the solution (P1, P2, Q1, Q2) of
1Note that there is at most one such common root for these two quadratic equations.
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(94)-(97) may take. First, if P1 > 0, P2 > 0 and Q1 = Q2 = 0, then µ1 = µ2 = 0. Hence,
from (94)-(95), we conclude that (P1, P2) is the positive common root of equations (83)-(84)
which are found in Section 8 and are rewritten here:
h1 (1 + g2P2)− g1 = λ1 (1 + h1P1) (1 + g1P1 + g2P2) (100)
h2 (1 + g1P1)− g2 = λ2 (1 + h2P2) (1 + g1P1 + g2P2) (101)
This root can be obtained through numerical solution. Secondly, if P1 > 0, Q2 > 0 and
P2 = Q1 = 0, then µ1 = ν2 = 0. Hence, from (94) and (96), we conclude that (P1, Q2) is the
positive common root of
h1 (1 + g2Q2)− g1 = λ1 (1 + h1P1) (1 + g1P1 + g2Q2) (102)
g2g1P1 = λ2 (1 + g2Q2) (1 + g1P1 + g2Q2) (103)
which can also be obtained through numerical solution. Thirdly, if P2 > 0, Q1 > 0 and
P1 = Q2 = 0, then µ2 = ν1 = 0. Hence, from (95) and (97), we conclude that (P2, Q1) is the
positive common root of
h2 (1 + g1Q1)− g2 = λ2 (1 + h2P2) (1 + g1Q1 + g2P2) (104)
g1g2P2 = λ1 (1 + g1Q1) (1 + g1Q1 + g2P2) (105)
which again can be obtained through numerical solution. The fourth non-zero form of
(P1, P2, Q1, Q2) is when P1 > 0 and P2 = Q1 = Q2 = 0, then µ1 = 0. Hence, from (94), P1
is given by (85) which is found in Section 8 and will be repeated here for convenience:
P1 =
1
2


√(
1
g1
−
1
h1
)2
+
4
λ1
(
1
g1
−
1
h1
)
−
(
1
g1
+
1
h1
) (106)
The last non-zero form of (P1, P2, Q1, Q2) is when P2 > 0 and P1 = Q1 = Q2 = 0, then
µ2 = 0. Hence, from (95), P2 is given by (86) in Section 8 and is given here again.
P2 =
1
2


√(
1
g2
−
1
h2
)2
+
4
λ2
(
1
g2
−
1
h2
)
−
(
1
g2
+
1
h2
) (107)
We obtain the following sufficient conditions on zero jamming powers Q1 and Q2. By
subtracting (96) from (94) and subtracting (97) from (95), we get
h1
1 + h1Q1
−
g1
1 + g1Q1 + g2Q2
+ µ1 − ν1 = 0 (108)
h2
1 + h2Q2
−
g2
1 + g1Q1 + g2Q2
+ µ2 − ν2 = 0 (109)
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which, by using the fact that the two users cannot be jamming together, give the following
conditions
Q1 = 0, if h1 > g1 (110)
Q2 = 0, if h2 > g2 (111)
Moreover, we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for the positivity of power allocations
in the possible transmission/jamming scenarios in each channel state. First, when no user
jams, i.e., Q1 = Q2 = 0, then from (94)-(95), we obtain the necessary and sufficient conditions
(87)-(87) of Section 8 which we repeat here for convenience.
P1 > 0, if and only if h1 −
g1
(1 + g2P2)
> λ1 (112)
P2 > 0, if and only if h2 −
g2
(1 + g1P1)
> λ2 (113)
Secondly, when user 1 does not jam and user 2 does not transmit, i.e., Q1 = P2 = 0, then
from (94) and (96), we can easily derive the following necessary and sufficient conditions for
the positivity of the transmission power P1 of user 1 and the jamming power Q2 of user 2.
P1 > 0, if and only if h1 −
g1
(1 + g2Q2)
> λ1 (114)
Q2 > 0, if and only if g2 −
g2
(1 + g1P1)
> λ2 (115)
Thirdly, when user 1 does not transmit and user 2 does not jam, i.e., P1 = Q2 = 0, then from
(95) and (97), we can similarly derive the following necessary and sufficient conditions for
the positivity of the transmission power P2 of user 2 and the jamming power Q1 of user 1.
P2 > 0, if and only if h2 −
g2
(1 + g1Q1)
> λ2 (116)
Q1 > 0, if and only if g1 −
g1
(1 + g2P2)
> λ1 (117)
Using conditions (110)-(117) given above, the power allocation policy (P1, P2, Q1, Q2)
that satisfies (94)-(97) and (90)-(91) can be fully described through the following cases of
the channel gains.
1. h1 > g1, h2 > g2. In this case, we must have Q1 = Q2 = 0. This follows directly from
(110)-(111). Hence, this case reduces to one of the 7 cases given in Section 8 depending
on the relative values of the channel gains and the values of λ1 and λ2. We can obtain
the power allocations P1 and P2 in the same way described in Section 8.
2. h1 > g1, h2 < g2. In this case, we must have P2 = Q1 = 0. This can be shown as
follows. From (110), we must have Q1 = 0. Suppose P2 > 0. Hence, µ2 = 0. Since
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dividing power among transmission and jamming is suboptimal, then we must have
Q2 = 0. Since Q1 = 0, then (109) implies h¯2 − g¯2 ≥ 0 which is a contradiction.
Therefore, P2 = 0. The power allocations P1 and Q2 are obtained from one of the
following sub-cases:
(a) h1 ≤ λ1 or h1 − g1 ≤ λ1, g2 ≤ λ2. We have P1 = Q2 = 0. To see this, note
that h1 ≤ λ1 implies that h1 −
g1
(1+g2Q2)
≤ λ1. Hence, using (114), we must have
P1 = 0 and thus Q2 = 0 since we cannot have a jamming user when the other
user is not transmitting. On the other hand, if g2 ≤ λ2, then it follows from (115)
that Q2 = 0. Hence, the fact that h1 − g1 ≤ λ1 together with (114) implies that
P1 = 0.
(b) h1 − g1 > λ1, g2 ≤ λ2. We have Q2 = 0 and P1 > 0 where P1 is given by (106).
This can be shown to be true as follows. Since g2 ≤ λ2, then, using (115), we
must have Q2 = 0. Hence, from (114) and the fact that h1 − g1 > λ1 in this case,
we must have P1 > 0.
(c) λ1 < h1 ≤ λ1 + g1, g2 > λ2. In this case, the solution (P1, Q2) may not be unique.
Namely, we either have P1 > 0 and Q2 > 0, or we have P1 = Q2 = 0. This is due
to the following facts. It is easy to see that P1 = Q2 = 0 satisfies h1−
g1
(1+g2Q2)
≤ λ1
and g2−
g2
(1+g1P1)
≤ λ2, i.e. conditions (114) and (115). It is also easy to see that we
can find positive P1 and Q2 that satisfy h1−
g1
(1+g2Q2)
> λ1 and g2−
g2
(1+g1P1)
> λ2,
i.e. conditions (114) and (115). Hence the solution (P1, Q2) may not be unique.
It remains to show that we cannot have P1 > 0, Q2 = 0. Suppose that P1 > 0
and Q2 = 0. Hence, we have h1−
g1
(1+g2Q2)
= h1−g1 ≤ λ1 which, by (114), implies
that P1 = 0 which is a contradiction. Thus, we cannot have P1 > 0 and Q2 = 0.
We obtain our power allocation policies for this case as follows. We examine the
solution of equations (102) and (103), if it yields a real and non-negative solution
(P1, Q2), then we take it as our solution (P1, Q2) for this case. Otherwise, we set
P1 = Q2 = 0.
(d) h1 − g1 > λ1, g2 > λ2. Here, we must have P1 > 0. However, we either have
Q2 > 0 or Q2 = 0, i.e., the solution may not be unique. To see this, we note that
h1 − g1 > λ1 implies that h1 −
g1
(1+g2Q2)
> λ2 for any Q2 ≥ 0. Hence, by (114),
we must have P1 > 0. However, we either have Q2 > 0 or Q2 = 0 depending on
whether the value of P1 satisfies g2 −
g2
(1+g1P1)
> λ1 or not. We obtain our power
allocation policy as follows. We first solve (102) and (103), if this yields a real and
non-negative solution (P1, Q2), then we take it to be the power allocation values
for this case. Otherwise, we set Q2 = 0 and P1 is obtained from (106).
3. h1 < g1, h2 > g2. From the symmetry between this case and the previous case, the
power allocation roles can be obtained in this case by interchanging the power allocation
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roles of users 1 and 2 in the previous case. In particular, we must have P1 = Q2 = 0.
The power allocations P2 and Q1 are given by one of the following sub-cases:
(a) h2 ≤ λ2 or g1 ≤ λ1, h2 − g2 ≤ λ2. We have P2 = Q1 = 0.
(b) g1 ≤ λ1, h2 − g2 > λ2. We have Q1 = 0 and P2 > 0 where P2 is given by (107).
(c) g1 > λ1, λ2 < h2 ≤ λ2 + g2. In this case, the solution (P2, Q1) may not be unique
as we either have P2 > 0 and Q1 > 0, or have P1 = Q2 = 0. Therefore, we obtain
our power allocation policy for this case by numerically solving equations (104)
and (105), if we have a real and non-negative solution (P2, Q1), then we take it as
to be the power allocation values for this case. Otherwise, we set P2 = Q1 = 0.
(d) g1 > λ1, h2 − g2 > λ2. Here, we must have P2 > 0. However, we either have
Q1 > 0 or Q1 = 0, i.e., the solution may not be unique. We obtain our power
allocation policy as follows. We first solve (104)-(105), if this yields a real and
non-negative solution (P2, Q1), then we take it to be the power allocation values
for this case. Otherwise, we set Q1 = 0 and P2 is obtained from (107).
4. h1 < g1, h2 < g2. In this case, we have P2 = Q1 = 0 or P1 = Q2 = 0. In order
to see this, suppose P1 > 0 and P2 > 0. Hence, µ1 = µ2 = 0. Since splitting a
user’s power into transmit and jamming powers is suboptimal, then we must have
Q1 = Q2 = 0. Thus, from (108) and (109), we have h¯1 ≥ g¯1 and h¯2 ≥ g¯2 which is a
contradiction. Therefore, we must have either P1 = 0 or P2 = 0. The power allocation
policy (P1, P2, Q1, Q2) is given in the following four sub-cases of channel states:
(a) (h1 ≤ λ1 or g2 ≤ λ2) and (h2 ≤ λ2 or g1 ≤ λ1). In this case, we have
P1 = P2 = Q1 = Q2 = 0. To see this, first, suppose that P2 = Q1 = 0. We note
that if h1 ≤ λ1 then h1−
g1
(1+g2Q2)
≤ λ1. Hence, using (114), we must have P1 = 0
and thus Q2 = 0 since we cannot have a jamming user when the other user is
not transmitting. On the other hand, if g2 ≤ λ2, then it follows from (115) that
Q2 = 0. Hence, the fact that h1 < g1 together with (114) implies that P1 = 0.
Next, suppose that P1 = Q2 = 0. Using the fact that h2 ≤ λ2 or g1 ≤ λ1 together
with condition (116)-(117), we can show that P2 = Q1 = 0. Therefore, in this
case, we must have P1 = P2 = Q1 = Q2 = 0.
(b) (h2 ≤ λ2 or g1 ≤ λ1) and (h1 > λ1, g2 > λ2). We have P2 = Q1 = 0. The
solution (P1, Q2) may not be unique. In particular, we may have P1 > 0, Q2 > 0
or have P1 = Q2 = 0. To see this, consider the following argument. Using the fact
that h2 ≤ λ2 or g1 ≤ λ1, then, as shown in case 4(a), we conclude that we must
have P2 = Q1 = 0. Now, we consider the power allocation policy (P1, Q2). We
note that P1 = Q2 = 0 satisfies conditions (114) and (115). On the other hand,
we can find positive P1 and Q2 that satisfy (114) and (114). Hence, the solution
(P1, Q2) may not be unique as we may have P1 = Q2 = 0 or P1 > 0, Q2 > 0.
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It remains to show that we cannot have P1 > 0, Q2 = 0. Suppose that P1 > 0
and Q2 = 0. Hence, we have h1 −
g1
(1+g2Q2)
= h1 − g1 < 0 < λ1 which, by (114),
implies that P1 = 0 which is a contradiction. Thus, we cannot have P1 > 0 and
Q2 = 0. Our power allocations P1 and Q2 are obtained for this case as follows.
We solve (102) and (103). If the solution gives a real and non-negative common
root (P1, Q2), we take it as our power allocation values for P1 and Q2. Otherwise,
we set P1 = Q2 = 0.
(c) (h1 ≤ λ1 or g2 ≤ λ2) and (h2 > λ2, g1 > λ1). By the symmetry between
this case and case 4(b), we have P1 = Q2 = 0. Again in this case, the solution
(P2, Q1) may not be unique. In particular, we may have P2 > 0, Q1 > 0 or have
P2 = Q1 = 0. In fact, the power allocation policy in this case, can be obtained
from case 4(b) by interchanging the roles of users 1 and 2. Our power allocations
P2 and Q1 are obtained as follows in this case. We solve (104)-(105). If the
solution gives a real and non-negative common root (P2, Q1), we take it as our
power allocation values for P2 and Q1. Otherwise, we set P2 = Q1 = 0.
(d) (h1 > λ1, g2 > λ2) and (h2 > λ2, g1 > λ1). Here, again the solution (P1, P2, Q1, Q2)
is not unique as we may either have P1 > 0, Q2 > 0, P2 = Q1 = 0, or P2 > 0, Q1 >
0, P1 = Q2 = 0, or P1 = P2 = Q1 = Q2 = 0. To see this, first, suppose
that P2 = Q1 = 0 and consider the power allocation policy (P1, Q2). As in
case 4(b), we can show that the solution (P1, Q2) may not be unique as we may
have P1 = Q2 = 0 or P1 > 0, Q2 > 0. However, as shown in case 4(b), we cannot
have P1 > 0, Q2 = 0. Next, suppose that P1 = Q2 = 0 and consider the power
allocation policy (P2, Q1). As in case 4(c), we can show that the solution (P2, Q1)
may not be unique as we may have P2 = Q1 = 0 or P2 > 0, Q1 > 0. However, we
cannot have P2 > 0, Q1 = 0. We obtain our allocation policy (P1, P2, Q1, Q2) as
follows. Let us denote the solution of (102) and (103) together by solution A and
denote the solution of (104) and (105) together by solution B.
i. If solution A yields a real non-negative (P1, Q2) while solution B does not yield
real non-negative (P2, Q1), then we take (P1, Q2) to be the power allocation
values for users 1 and 2, respectively, and set P2 = Q1 = 0.
ii. If solution B yields a real non-negative (P2, Q1) while solution A does not yield
real non-negative (P1, Q2), then we take (P2, Q1) to be the power allocation
values for users 2 and 1, respectively, and set P1 = Q2 = 0.
iii. If neither solution A nor solution B gives real non-negative common root,
then we set P1 = P2 = Q1 = Q2 = 0.
iv. If both solutions A and B yield a real non-negative common root, then we
either choose the root given by solution A, i.e., (P1, Q2), and set P2 = Q1 = 0,
or choose the root given by solution B, i.e., (P2, Q1), and set P1 = Q2 = 0.
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We make the choice that maximizes the achievable instantaneous secrecy sum
rate.
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